

CHRIS JONES



# ENGLAND'S NADIR?

A REVISIONIST  
ASSESSMENT OF  
DON REVIE'S  
TERM AS ENGLAND  
MANAGER

1974-77

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OF DON REVIE'S TERM AS  
ENGLAND MANAGER**

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## A Career in Football

DON REVIE, at 14, had been an apprentice bricklayer but it was not for him. What was for him was sharing the playing field with the likes of Raich Carter and Stanley Matthews and, perhaps, earning some of the financial extras that top professionals accrued. In *Soccer's Happy Wanderer* there is a passage where Revie shows himself as an intelligent young man who had thought through issues relating to his employment and the game in general, in terms of contracts and finances. In this slim, 107-page volume, Revie brings forward a book full of thoughts. Never more so than on page 20 where he argues, 'It is perhaps a Utopian point of view, but I think there would not be so much wrangling in football if it is possible for a player to move from one club to another with the ease that I moved from Newport Boys to Middlesbrough Swifts.' In that one statement he encapsulated the wholly subservient position of the English professional footballer in the mid-1950s. His point is 'Utopian' and he is clearly concerned that it will be seen as a radical suggestion, by using that word, but all he is asking for, in reality, is that professional footballers have the same employment rights as millions of other people in 1950s England. This was the fundamental right to change your employer if you so wished.

Before he became an experienced and forthright international player, he started his journey, as everyone did, through junior levels and here he encountered the unusual person, in 1940s English youth football, of Bill Sanderson. It was here that Revie's focus on planning and preparation was first on the agenda. *Soccer's Happy Wanderer* is a very

different player biography from many others of the early and mid-1950s. This is a book where an experienced player has thought about multiple aspects of the game and shares them with the footballing public. Certain parts can be read as a proto-draft of the manager that Revie was to become. He is already thinking about a post-playing career in football management and how he will shape the younger individuals he would be responsible for into an effective unit. For those who would be amazed and perplexed 20 years later regarding Revie's dossiers when England manager, he was already discussing the absolute centrality of preparation before many of his future England team had even started school. In complete contrast to many of the established stars of the 1940s and early 1950s, most notably Stanley Matthews, Revie categorically states, 'No one will ever convince me that pre-match tactical talks do not serve a useful purpose. They help players get a clearer picture of what is expected of them.' In tandem is another statement on page 21 that confirms the radical approach that Revie would instigate in his own managerial career. He wrote, 'It is absolutely vital to discuss the opposition – their strengths and weaknesses and also your own team to have their own pet moves thoroughly worked out.'

Another aspect of Revie's managerial career already outlined in this perceptive book is the power of mentoring younger players. Revie saw it as the responsibility of older, experienced players to help youngsters in training, preparation and through intelligent calling for the ball on the pitch. In *Happy Wanderer* there are clear examples of the strange dichotomy that filled Revie's later life in football management, both at Leeds United and England, which was the depth of preparation on one side juxtaposed with the belief in superstition and rituals on the other. The hardship of his childhood was replaced by the dangerous existence of being a professional footballer. As Revie describes it, 'A footballer's life hangs on the very slender threads of chance.'

Injury ends careers and the public soon forgets the heroes of yesterday.' The problem for players in the maximum wage era was twofold as not only could their career and wage packet be over in one afternoon, but what would their futures hold? There would be little money from the club and most players had no substantial financial nest egg to help them and their families even over the short term.

Revie never wanted to return to the daily poverty of his childhood – of limited food and deeply limited options. However, on two separate occasions, extreme injury nearly ended his playing career. At his first professional club, Leicester City, he suffered a severe triple fracture of an ankle. This was almost the end of his professional career before it had begun. Revie's incredible determination brought him back from the precipice. According to himself, only one in a thousand did come back to full level after this specific injury – and he was that one. The second major injury was also whilst playing for Leicester and this was a haemorrhage in the form of an endless nose bleed from which he literally nearly bled to death. This horrendous episode emphasised the medical incompetence of football management at the time as it was decided to drive the bleeding Revie home, hundreds of miles away. On finally arriving at hospital, he was informed by the doctor that if the blood flow had not been stemmed in the next hour, he would have died.

During his playing career, Revie was known mostly for two things – his movement from one club to another and the so-called Revie Plan, which found prominence in the 1956 FA Cup Final victory for Manchester City. In his professional career Revie played for five clubs – Leicester City, Hull City, Manchester City, Sunderland and Leeds United. A modern follower of the game wouldn't see anything unusual at all in a player having five clubs over a long career. In 1940s and 1950s English football this was unusual. In the maximum wage era, there was little point moving from club to club as, officially, you couldn't be offered enhanced financial terms by



a new employer. Players were focused on retaining a position with a singular club over a long period in order to qualify for a testimonial. If a testimonial was awarded to a player, then it was usually after ten years at a club. This was the financial be-all and end-all for players during this era. It brought forward the main opportunity for a player to accrue a lump sum of money for a post-playing life.

Revie's playing career took a different path, a path of movement from club to club removing any possibility of a testimonial season. This regular movement was seen as suspicious by many. It was claimed that Revie agitated for moves on a two, or three-year cycle as it was one of the other limited ways in which a player could make extra sums from the game. These were undisclosed percentage payments the player may receive as part of the transfer fee. Of course, Revie, and many others, was never forthcoming about payments that he may have received and explained his regular movement in other terms. He states that he left Leicester City to go to Hull City due to a combination of perfectly legitimate factors. His wife, Elsie, was the niece of the Leicester manager Johnny Duncan and Revie argued that he felt awkward with potential claims of nepotism. In addition to this push there was the considerable pull of Horatio Carter. A legendary player of the inter-war period, Raich Carter was player-manager at Hull and Revie was deeply motivated to play alongside one of his heroes. Paradoxically this was a disaster, as Revie states himself in *Happy Wanderer*, he could not put a foot right at Hull as he and Carter compressed one another on the pitch and flooded one another's space. To avoid further issues with Carter, Revie decided to move on again to Manchester City. It was at Maine Road that Revie found the high point of his career with the famous FA Cup win over Birmingham City in 1956 and the winning strategy of the Revie Plan. Indeed, so important is the Revie Plan deemed to be in his career that, along with the FA Cup journeys of 1955 and 1956, it covers almost 40 per cent of *Soccer's Happy Wanderer*. Mostly

in a block of around 40 pages are a series of intricate diagrams of tactics, team play and Revie's on-pitch positioning. This was highly unusual for a British footballer's autobiography of the 1950s. The irony was that Revie was most certainly not exclusively responsible for the development of this plan or its implementation in the FA Cup Final. The Revie Plan was an English club version of Hungary's playing system of the early 1950s which had been so successful up to the 1954 World Cup Final in Switzerland. The perceived key was the 'withdrawn' centre-forward role. This position, executed by Nandor Hidegkuti for the Hungarians, gave that player time and space in a creative pocket where they could dictate offensive play. Part of the key was that you needed a player of a high skill level to appreciate and deliver on this responsibility. Revie was the designated player for Manchester City that May afternoon in 1956. This position was one of the main reasons Hungary had famously destroyed England twice in six months – 6-3 at Wembley in November 1953 and then 7-1 in Budapest the following May. What is interesting about the Revie Plan is that it actually worked so effectively. The 1956 FA Cup Final was a full 30 months after the famous 6-3 game.

The enigma of Revie's playing career of stops and starts, of serious injuries and movement from club to club was put to bed with the success and fame of the Revie Plan. The importance of the plan was that it was a clear example of some people in England thinking about the game and how it should be played in an effective and exciting style. However, paradoxically, in *Soccer's Happy Wanderer* Revie links this plan to the distant past, not the present or future. The plan sat well with the overall view that Revie was a 'schemer' and thinker of the game. To emphasise Raich Carter's point, he was a 'footballers' footballer, unobtrusive but always in the right place at the right time'.

Revie's brief, six-cap international career came mostly in 1955 and 1956, though he made his debut in 1954 versus

Northern Ireland in the same game that Johnny Haynes made his debut. His playing career was, unquestionably, at its peak during the mid-1950s. This culminated in him winning the Football Writers' Association (FWA) Footballer of the Year Award in 1955. Revie had played alongside one of his childhood heroes, Carter, and now he would line up with another one – the incomparable Stanley Matthews. The extraordinary length of Matthews' career meant that by the 1950s he was playing for England with much younger men who had watched and idolised him as children. Even in his brief comments on Matthews in *Happy Wanderer*, Revie leaves us thinking about the context of his assessment. By the 1950s it was basically impossible to criticise Matthews directly in public environments, due to his God-like status. However, that did not mean his highly fixed style of play and rigid outlook were not criticised in the dressing room, certainly by Billy Wright, and obliquely in print. Revie originally points out that by 1955 the greatest experience of his life was playing alongside Matthews for England. However, in a repetition of the situation with Carter, their first appearance together was a flop. All Revie says about this is that 'Matthews was a law unto himself'. He appears to leave it hanging there for any reader to interpret as they wish. In that one, short sentence is Revie really telling us that he didn't rate Matthews at the highest possible level due to the fixity of his play, which by 1955 had basically been the same for around 20 years?

In a strange parallel to the accusations that befell Revie as England manager 20 years later, in the mid-1970s, his England career was over in a flash. He was ecstatic to be called up for the perceived ultimate game against Scotland in 1955 at Wembley. To Revie, as to many others, this was the most valuable cap to earn. In front of that vast crowd, you were positioned in a chain all the way back to the original football international of 1872. England destroyed Scotland 7-2 in 1955 and Revie scored. This was the high point for Revie in his international career. He was enthused by the

England team and felt, along with others, that this was a side that was going to put them 'on top of the tree'. However, it was the same pattern as many times before for England. The national team then took part in a tour of Continental Europe with Revie playing in a defeat to France. He played in three further internationals for England, which culminated in October 1956 in a game against Northern Ireland. As was the pattern of the day, of his six games for England only two were against wholly foreign opposition, in the form of France and Denmark. The other four were against British opponents from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Then the axe of the International Selection Committee came down in the common manner that happened for decades. As with so many players of his era he was brought in by the International Selection Committee with no real explanation, into a system that was only just beginning to change with a slow implementation of the coaching of Walter Winterbottom, with minimal preparation time and minimal financial input. If you didn't perform in your limited opportunities to a level of Cruyff, Puskás, Zico, Zidane and Beckenbauer combined, then you were jettisoned and replaced by the next sensation who was going to fix all of England's perceived problems in their part of the pitch.

Post-England, Revie moved again to Sunderland and then took a step down in his final move as a club player to Division Two Leeds United. There is no question this was a drop for a player who thought about the game and trained and prepared. When Revie arrived in 1958, Leeds were, fundamentally, a nothing club who had achieved absolutely zero in their history. Leeds was unusual in England, in that it was a large city, along with only Newcastle-upon-Tyne, with just one professional football team. However, sporting interest in the city was not focused on football but rugby league and cricket, with football a definite third. Revie recounted many times how shocked and affronted he was by the attitude of many at the club – the rundown ground and training facilities

and the unprofessional attitude of many of the players, with particular reference to Jack Charlton. Revie was only at Leeds for six weeks as a player when he was voted club captain by the other players. A clear indication of the immediate impact of his personality and ideas on those around him.

Second Division mediocrity followed for the remainder of Revie's playing career until the inevitable crux of all professional footballers, the day they know their playing days are drawing to a close and a new job has to be sought quickly to pay the bills. Revie was approached by Bournemouth about a managerial post. The story goes that as a Leeds official was making out a written reference for Revie related to the Bournemouth position, he suddenly questioned why on earth he was recommending him to another club when he had all the necessary attributes to be manager of Leeds. This does read like a manufactured anecdote tripped out after Leeds became so successful but, without doubt, Bournemouth's loss was Leeds' gain. The task was enormous for Revie. Leeds were in the second tier of English football with basically no money to spend on players. They weren't a sleeping giant like Liverpool when his good friend Bill Shankly went there or even a mid-sized club who had a history such as Derby County when Brian Clough and Peter Taylor took over. Revie was the logical and affordable choice for Leeds. He took to management as if he were born for it. Just how did he do it, bringing this club from where it sat in 1961 to all the trophies and finals and drama up to when he left to manage England in the summer of 1974? That period split football fans in England over their view on Leeds. Were they Super Leeds or Dirty Leeds? Did you scream or laugh at their almost endless list of near misses? Whatever your response there was no ignoring Leeds from 1964 to 1974 and their incredible rise from obscurity to league titles, European and domestic trophy wins, a team rammed with international players and full houses on a regular basis. The core person responsible for this complete change in fortunes was Don Revie. He

fundamentally achieved this revolution in status by intensity and utilising every possible factor that could be brought into the fold to gain advantage for his 'boys'.

Intensity is the most apt word to describe Revie and his club managerial career. In a pattern repeated by the likes of Shankly, Alex Ferguson and Arsène Wenger, he never appeared to switch off from the endless demands of building and running a major football club to the highest possible standards. The ever-perceptive Johnny Giles focuses on the word intensity in summation of Revie's Leeds career. He concluded that Revie worked endlessly on every detail at the club, knowing how to keep players happy and motivated. When Leeds appointed him as manager in 1961, the restriction on their situation dictated the style within which Revie had to manage. Fundamentally, Leeds had very little money and with the exception of buying back John Charles from Juventus they certainly couldn't go out and buy superstar players for big transfer fees. Even if they had the money for that level of player, why would they have gone to Leeds at that point? There were a small number of established players brought in for mid-level transfer fees, certainly Bobby Collins from Everton and Johnny Giles from Manchester United were both absolutely crucial for Leeds under Revie. However, due to the financial restrictions, the largest group of players had to come through their own youth development and scouting programmes.

Here was Revie's great strength – taking a group of very young men and in some cases boys and moulding and developing them, not just as individual players and as a unit, but as young adults. His level of control over shaping this group, including Billy Bremner, Paul Reaney, Peter Lorimer, Paul Madeley, Norman Hunter and Eddie Gray, was all-encompassing. Revie initiated a structure where Leeds players were, according to Hunter, not allowed long hair, a moustache, a beard or to wear jeans. His players had to wear a collar and tie and conservative-coloured suits on matchdays.

As with almost all managers of that era he wanted to see his players married and 'settled down' early in adult life. Revie's level of input into his players' lives, incredibly, even included gifts and flowers to players' wives and families on birthdays, anniversaries or if they were ill. He involved the club in educating these young men about bank accounts, table manners and how to behave in public environments. He was also there to listen to his surrogate 'sons' and help and support them with issues and problems they may have in their lives. Of course, this was not all done for purely altruistic reasons, it was about removing any negative factors so that his young warriors were comfortable and would focus all their physical and mental energy on their upcoming match performance. Once again Johnny Giles serves as a sounding board for Revie's work and approach during this period. Quoted in Patrick Barclay's *Sir Matt Busby: The Definitive Biography* he stresses the differences between Busby's Manchester United and Revie's Leeds. Manchester United were the glamour club who had their pick of the wonder boys from all over the country – Duncan Edwards (Dudley), Bobby Charlton (Ashington) and George Best (Belfast). Giles argues that his old team-mates Hunter, Reaney, Madeley and Terry Cooper wouldn't have even got through the door at Old Trafford. It was, according to Giles, the environment created by Revie at Leeds that made these teenagers into top players.

Of course, though Revie built these layers of control within Leeds, the conundrum, as for all football managers, was that the one time of the week when direct control is dramatically reduced is in the crucial 90-minute slot that actually counts – the match itself. Revie would attempt to control this arena through other additional approaches – the famous Revie dossiers, his personal belief in prayer and rituals and, most controversially, the gamesmanship of Leeds. All this was a focus to win, nothing else was acceptable. Jack Charlton, clarifying in his own distinctive style, said, 'You weren't there to enjoy yourself or enjoy the game. You were

there to get results and to win games and to work hard at every game and produce what you had to produce.'

The dossiers which Revie and his assistants began and added to endlessly over the years were a bedrock of Leeds throughout his time as manager. Revie was not unique in producing his dossiers; even in England there were a small number of coaches and managers such as Dave Sexton who utilised this approach. However, no one did it in such a high-profile manner and quite so thoroughly as Revie. There were comments, notes, files and dossiers on a whole myriad of areas – clubs, pitches, players, habits, strengths, weaknesses and the referee. From 1974 to 1977, the dossiers became a stick with which to beat Revie when he was England manager and they will be covered in greater detail later. At Leeds they were valued as a vital component in the professional outlook and preparedness that took the club from Second Division mediocrity to league titles in 1969 and 1974 and multiple European trophies.

One of the most powerful men in English football in the 1960s and 1970s was Alan Hardaker, secretary of the Football League or simply *Hardaker of the League*, the title of his 1977 autobiography. Another forceful, brusque Yorkshireman, he and Revie, to say the least, did not get on. Hardaker is not universally negative about Revie, but their relationship was one of endless confrontations. Hardaker perceived Revie as totally ruthless, selfish and devious, as someone who would regularly cut corners to get what he wanted and as Leeds manager was 'a pain in the neck'. He would argue his case to Hardaker over a plethora of issues to attempt to improve the situation for Leeds – the restrictions imposed on him by international call-ups, multiple injuries, the choice of referees and the switching of fixtures to try to avoid backlogs and the endless issue for successful teams of playing a large number of games in a tight time frame. Revie's position of arguing the case for Leeds created regular tensions between the two that would carry on well into the period of Revie's management



of England. Hardaker's response to Revie was to fight fire with fire and show Revie who really had control. He fined Leeds £5,000 for fielding a deliberately understrength team against Southampton in 1970.

Revie tried everything to keep some of his international players out of upcoming games for England, Scotland, Wales or the Republic of Ireland which clashed with crucial matches for Leeds. He was far from alone in this tactic. Brian Clough did it when he withdrew Roy McFarland from the important European Championship quarter-final against West Germany at Wembley in 1972, only for the defender to miraculously recover from his injury 48 hours later. Revie's problem in this area was exacerbated by success. Leeds were consistently one of the best English teams during this era, so it was only natural that these high-performing players should be called up for their country and in the case of some, such as Giles, Bremner, Charlton, Cooper and Lorimer, be key for their respective nations.

A further area where Revie tried to elicit control and contain factors that were outside his immediate orbit of influence was through religion and his almost endless superstitions. By his own admission, Revie was the most superstitious man in the world but it passed beyond just plain superstitious habits and foibles into an entire parallel belief system that mapped out every day and every movement within every day. A pseudo structure that, far from being about control of others or happenings was, in reality, a process that controlled the life of Don Revie. Today it would probably be interpreted as a mild mental health issue. Some of the Revie beliefs around what was good luck or bad luck or were repetitive rituals were fairly standard but some were certainly unusual. In parallel to these rituals was his more formal religious belief and how, as for many millions of people, it gave him comfort and another friend 'on his side' before an important match. He prayed every night on his knees, but particularly the night before a match. A manner of thanking

God for his family and the positives of his life and what he had secured from football in terms of a good living and a level of comfort well away from that of his Middlesbrough childhood and youth. When at Leeds he would arrange for a minister from Knaresborough to visit his players every week, in order to give them a different perspective or a broadening of their emotional development. Reading countless biographies and autobiographies of British players and their near-endless anecdotes of ‘birds, boozing and gambling’, was it such a strange approach for an older man who was genuinely concerned about the morality and physical and spiritual well-being of young men in his charge to offer such an option? Even if he would ask his players to slip in a request to God to specifically make them better players.

The list of Revie’s parallel belief system that most have termed superstitions was so extensive that it is a miracle he ever got out of his house in the morning and managed to make it to his place of employment. All aspects were covered. He carried an entire range of trinkets and lucky mascots – a small statue of St John of the Cross in his coat or jacket pocket, along with a rabbit’s foot and two pieces of wood from a gypsy woman that he’d had since his playing career that would bring him good fortune and success in his life path. In addition to his pockets being weighted down with charms covering all angles, Revie had a vast array of habits and restrictions that influenced his every turn. There was the famous lucky blue suit worn until it virtually dropped off him and a new one was made for each new football season. He also had his lucky tie, he always sat in the same seat on the team coach and took the same walk to a nearby set of traffic lights before every home game. He never turned back to his home once he had left and his players had to put their boots on in the same order each match. The same players had to carry balls out to a match when the team were always in the same order running on to the pitch. In addition, Revie used to take all the players’ boots into a big sack for away trips and

even buy a seat on a plane so the large sack of the precious boots could be placed there in perfect safety. He allegedly had a gypsy curse removed from Elland Road. Revie hated all representations of birds as they were sure-fire bad luck and, from somewhere in the depths of his febrile psyche, he had come to associate ornamental elephants with misfortune, too. His wife had to wear the same coat for matches as that had been deemed lucky and he once upbraided Alan Hardaker for wearing an unlucky green coat in the directors' box for a Leeds match. There may well have been others.

This long list of compression acted as a framework for himself and those around him in his all-consuming work of controlling and winning. Almost claustrophobic in its construct, Revie had taken the belief in almost shamanistic involvement to results and performance. However, no matter how unusual this exhausting list may appear he was just a more extreme example of the patterns that were followed by many others in football. Your fortune, in a financial context as much as any, was in the hands of others diminishing the control over your own existence – your fellow players, the manager and coaches, your opponents, the referee, the pitch, the bobble, the deflection, the weather, illness, the influence of the crowd, the football authorities. All could be responsible for events well beyond your control to mean defeat or multiple defeats, loss of cup finals or relegation and a downward career path.

Footballers and managers and fans are absorbed in rituals and actions that in other areas of their lives they would not even entertain. Other methodical managers who focused on preparation just as much as Revie were also riven by the ritual world. Arrigo Sacchi, the creator of one of the greatest European club sides in the AC Milan of the late 1980s and early 1990s, appears to have been shaped by such beliefs almost as much as Revie. He believed the number 17 brought him good luck; when Marco van Basten would pay him a compliment he would touch wood in recognition; he consulted

astrologers; an encounter with a horse was a positive event; an encounter with a sheep was a negative event; doing push-ups before a match was a positive attribute. Nils Leidholm is another example of managers who called in extra help for victory. Once when Carlo Ancelotti accidentally picked up Leidholm's jacket when he was a player at Roma, he found the pockets full of pendants and good luck charms. Leeds were also notorious for their gamesmanship and there were always rumours and later allegations of illegal payments and bungs to be dealt with. The vast majority of these claims in some of the national newspapers came years after Revie had walked away from the England manager's post and the knives that had been ever sharpened over the decades were now out and ready to be plunged.

Revie was a dictator at Leeds United. He was a dictator in his high levels of control over the club that he more or less created. He was a dictator in his work environment in the same manner as Jock Stein, Matt Busby, Bill Shankly and Brian Clough. Jack Charlton called him 'The Master' and, at Leeds, he was. His dedication to his duty of fundamentally getting Leeds to win football matches was of a level second to none. Any advantage and process he could introduce which could bring, what later became known as, marginal gains, was constant. It was Revie who endlessly planned, organised, studied, would refuse the likes of Norman Hunter and Allan Clarke to be released for England games, would personally give players his special soapy body massage the day before a game. He was a shop floor man, a players' manager, who did everything he could for his players with the clear reciprocal agreement that they would do everything they could for him. Richard Giulianotti concluded that Revie was a highly Fordist manager. The basis of his comment is Revie's dossiers, which were highly controversial even in their existence in the 1970s. An anti-Fordist manager in the form of Brian Clough was adamant about the lack of effectiveness of dossiers, saying, 'Footballers don't read dossiers. Footballers forget to bring

their passports when they go on foreign trips. Footballers lose the keys to their hotel rooms.' It was during this period of Revie's rise to managerial prominence that the role and presence of the club manager dramatically changed. Stephen Wagg argues in *The Football World* that there was a passage from sacrificial clerks to wily wheeler-dealers to, by the late 1960s, miracle-working media personalities. Neil Carter, in *The Football Manager: A History*, expands Wagg's point that by around 1970 it was the public's view of a football manager that he was a charismatic figurehead who was all-powerful in the club structure. This was a position validated through their media representation.

However, in this obsessive commitment to duty there was always a negative side to Leeds. They often concentrated on the negation of opponents. Revie was interpreted as a schemer by many who had always had opprobrium placed on him. There had always been whispers around how Revie and Leeds won and the levels that they were prepared to go to, which were claimed to be well beyond the rules of the game. Bungs and bribes had always been a part of the game but due to their illegality it is very difficult to ascertain their prevalence. In 1977, 15 years after the alleged incident, Bob Stokoe remembered that the under-fire Revie had attempted to bribe him. Revie was at the beginning of his period as Leeds manager in the Second Division and Stokoe was the new manager of Bury. It was before a crucial league match in 1962 that Stokoe claimed Revie offered him £500 for Bury to 'take it easy' in a game against Leeds. The mythology and accusations would become 'real' after Revie resigned in 1977, in the sense that when it was a journalistic free-for-all in order to gain revenge on him for walking out of the England job; they came forward and the claims were reported as gospel truth. Whether they were true or not has never been ascertained, but Revie was never prosecuted in a court of law under any of the Stokoe-type accusations.